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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF COMMON OFFICERS IN INTERCORPORATE TRANSACTIONS-

The overwhelming development of corporate organization in recent years," and
particularly the increasing pace of interlocking of interests and concentration of
control in the hands of a few individuals, 2 have brought prominently before
the courts a number of problems created by the presence of common officers
on the boards and executive staffs of corporations contracting with each other.
The questions involved are interesting because of their practical importance
owing to increased incidence. They illustrate convincingly that the technique
of common law, evolved under an individualistic organization of industry, is
markedly inadequate when applied to the unique problems of the collectivized
unit.
Shortly after the Civil War, in a period of sudden corporate development
and considerable attendant fraud, the courts were first faced with contracts
made by corporate officers and directors, through themselves, with their corporations.2 Adversity of interest of those in a position of trust suggested the
application of what existing concepts were available from the adjudicated relations of individual enterprise-those of dual agency and of trust. By either
approach, adverse dealing with the principal or cestui que trust was rendered
voidable ' at his option on grounds of a warm appreciation of human frailty.
The situation at hand was a commercial rarity and was obviously dangerous;
the prophylaxis of the trust-agency relation was felt to be particularly appropriate and was applied. 5 When, shortly thereafter, the same sort of official
was found common to another corporation in a transaction with the first, the
analogy was easily drawn. 6
It became gradually apparent, however, that such dealings were becoming
increasingly common, were not necessarily diabolical, and were decidedly desired
by the business community7 The consummate protection accorded the shareSee, tracing the tremendous recent increase in importance of the corporate form, BEIL
AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) chapters II and III.
ISee the table of mergers in BmLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note I, Appendix D, and
Table XII, p. 95, for an illustration of the prevalent interlocking of controlling interests.
On the general problem of the contracts of officers with their companies, see Note
(1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 338; Note (Ig3i) 19 CALIF. L. REV. 304, and references therein cited.
"Throughout this note the writer has .followed the courts and text-writers in making a
convenient use of the somewhat loose term "voidable". As used in this connection it expresses the general determination of the courts, upon the bringing of a bill in equity in objection to a transaction, to consider the transaction as non-existent, restoring the parties as nearly
as possible to their original position. Most generally the cases involve a sale of, property,
the decree requiring its reconveyance, or a contract for services, the decree freeing both
parties as nearly as possible from their obligations thereunder. The intervening rights of
third parties, questions of equity jurisprudence, or peculiar subject-matter of the transaction,
may conceivably produce a difference in result. These possibilities the writer has been unable
to treat.
Where an agent secretly acts for both parties to a transaction, the almost universal rule
permits its avoidance at the option of either party. MEcHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1189.
The rule is strictly prophylactic regardless of the bona fides of the transaction.
See Alger, Other People's Money, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, December, 1930, at 730; RIPIEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) 21 ff.
' See Bowman, The Validity of Contracts Between Corporations Having Common Directors (i9o6) 4 Mica. L. REv. 577; James, Interested Directors in Corporate Transactions
(1931) 6 IND. L. J. 413.
'The vacillation of the courts in the face of the increasing prevalence of the corporate
form, even before 19oo, is well illustrated in Bowman, supra note 6, particularly in the study
of the New York decisions, at 593 ff. Cases holding transactions prima facie valid are at
least as old as x881. Id. at 578.
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holder was becoming an increasing commercial hindrance. In the face of this
new, realistic pressure the rule of voidability, and along with it the ready trust
analogy, suffered a gradual decay, not, however, without considerable hesitation
on the part of the courts and a burst of enthusiasm for prophylaxis in "trustbusting" days." It was not until the landslide of capitalistic enterprise into the
corporate form and the change of heart of the public generally from opposition
to amazed tolerance, taking place in the last twenty years, that prevention became a definitely lost cause and the principle of validation where fair plainly
ascendant.
At the present time, a small minority of American courts 9 and the courts
of England 10 are still committed to the rule that a transaction between corporations having common officers is ipso facto voidable at the suit of either
corporation. Certain state courts, compromising between distrust of corporate
management and a desire to facilitate fair transactions, apply the prophylactic
rule where common officers constitute a majority and permit the transaction to
stand on proof of its fairness where such officers constitute a minority only."
Such a distinction, whether a conscientious compromise or an attempt to draw
a rough workable rule, is obviously artificial. In the variety of factual situations
made possible by the corporate organization, there is no reason why a minority
of directors or officials should not wield a compelling influence over their colleagues. "' The federal courts have accordingly applied the test of fairness as
the token of validity to all transactions marked by interlocking directorates, no
14
13
By this rule, widely accepted as the "better view",
matter how constituted.

such transactions are "subject to keen scrutiny", but not voidable if fair, the
burden of showing fairness resting with those by whom the contract is sought
'The influence of the "anti-trust" era is plainly evident in the vigorous support of the
old rule by Pam, Interlocking Directorates,the Problem and Its Solutlio (1913) 26 HAv.
L. REv. 467. The article, however, in presenting the then existing law as strictly prohibitory,
is misleading. The author draws his conclusions from the decisions of the New York court
only, which deserted the prohibitory rule in the next case before it. Globe Woolen Co. v.
Utica Gas Co., 224 N. Y. 483, 121 N. E. 378 (1918).
'Alabama Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Dubberly, 198 Ala. 545, 73 So. 911 (1917) ; O'Connor
Min. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614, IO So. 290 (1891) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald &
Mallory Constr. Co., 44 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899 (1895) ; Pearson v. Concord R. Corp., 62
N. H. 537 (1883) ; Attala Iron Ore Co. v. Virginia Iron Co., III Tenn. 527, 77 S.W. 774
(1903).
"Aberdeen R. R. v. Blaikie Bros., I Macq. H. L. Cases 461 (Scot. 1853). In England
the prohibitory rule has been incorporated into the Company's Act, permitting withdrawal.
See infra note 24.
n San Diego etc. R. Co. v. Pacific Beach Co., 112 Cal. 53, 44 Pac. 333 (1896) ; Laybourn
v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 211 Pac. 367 (1922) ; Jordan v. Jordan Co., 94 Conn. 384, lo9 Atl.
This
x8i (12o); Crocker v. Cumberland Min. Co., 31 S.D. 137, 139 N. W. 783 (1913).
is the rule most generally applied to direct contracts with officers, even by courts allowing a
more liberal rule in cases of intercorporate transactions. BALLAxTINE, CoRORATIbOsS (1927)
§ 123; 3 FLETcHER, CYcLO.PEDIA OF CoaPoRATIoNs (Perm. ed. 1931) § 936. The instant rule
has been described as the "prevalent rule" in regard to intercorporate transactions. BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra, at 392. In view of the recent trend toward the federal rule, however,

this is exceedingly questionable.
"See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Co., supra note 8, at 489,

121 N. E. at 380.
Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S.68, 40 Sup. Ct. 82 (1919) ; Geddes v. Anaconda Min. Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (1921) ; Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic
Iron Co., 261 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard,
292 Fed. 815 (C. C. A. ist, 1923). The federal rule has been increasingly favored by the
state courts, so as to appear definitely in the ascendancy. Public Service Comm. v. City of
Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137 N. E. 705 (1922) ; Calnan v. Guaranty Sec. Corp., 271 Mass.
533, 171 N. E. 830 (1930) ; South Side Trust Co. v. Washington Tin Plate Co., 252 Pa. 237,
97 Atl. 450 (igi6) ; Westland v. Post Land Co., I15 Wash. 329, 197 Pac. 44 (1921).
" BALL.ANTINE, op. cit. supra note II, at 393; James, supra note 6, 418; Note (1925) 11
VA. L. R .636, 637; Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 338, 346.
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to be sustained.. 5 In a few states a more "liberal" rule is announced, placing
the proof of unfairness on those seeking to avoid the transaction.' 6
The reasons advanced as justifying the change in attitude consist in a frank
admission of a necessary reversal of attitude to meet the corporate situation.
A contract between two corporations with any number of common officers may
conceivably be highly beneficial to both. In a commercial system in which the
corporate form has become the almost universal type of organization, and in
which increasing interrelation of the structures themselves and of their directors
and officers has rapidly developed, the ready rule of prohibition has become a
practical hindrance. The policy of facilitation has definitely triumphed over
the policy of removal of temptation.
Necessarily, in the course of the process, the trust and agency analogies
have suffered a number of blows. 17 The corporate officer may deal adversely;
he is not required to make any disclosure of possibility of profit if the transaction be "fair"; he may in most jurisdictions avoid any necessity of making disclosure by withdrawing from the transaction."' The courts, in describing the
duties attendant upon the requirement of "fairness", have gradually discarded
trust terminology, and have been content with declaring that the officer stands
in a "fiduciary relation".' 9 Such a concept seems to be merely a rationalizing
label to be attached to a result previously determined purely by the court's
balance of the equities of the case.
The essential question, then, under the ascendant rule, becomes the test
of the "reasonableness" of the contract in the opinion of the court. Short of
the automatic prohibition of the prophylactic rule no mechanical regulation is
possible. Each transaction must be examined in the light of its peculiar facts
in the spirit of pure equity, under a test that is as eventual as possible and as
variable in the discretion of each court. Certain general principles are available,2" but essentially, the validation of any contract depends upon the judgment
of the court as to what amounts to a question of the business ethics involved. 2 '
Fine questions in ethics are not the sort which arouse shareholders' indignation
to the point of giving rise to concerted and expensive litigation. But under
recent criticism of corporate practice such problems are becoming increasingly
I Though described in some opinions as a "burden of proof" it is probably merely a burden of producing evidence based upon the better position of officers in regard to knowing the
facts. See 3 F.E-cHm, op. cit. supra note ii, § 974.
"Frank H. Buck Co. v. Tuxedo Land Co., lo9 Cal. App. 453, 293 Pac. 122 (930);
Evansville Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 144 Ind. 34, 42 N. E. io97 (1896) ; Polacheck v. Michiwaukee Golf Club Land Co., 97 Wis. 595, 223 N. W. 233 (1929). The casting of the burden of showing fairness on those seeking to sustain the transaction-which amounts to placing
it on the common officer-has been attacked as "inconsistent" with a consideration of the
contract as "prima facie valid". See Note (1929) 29 CoL L. REv. 338. It would seem, however, no more contradictory than the rule of res ipsa loquitur in tort, and to be practically
justified by the inability of shareholders to gain evidence. See infra note 33.
7 See Note (93i) ig CALIF. L. Ray. 3o4; Note (1929) 29 CoT. L. REv. 338, 345. There
was always, of course, the objection that the corporate officer did not hold legal title to the
corporate property. See Note (1912) 25 HAuv. L. REv. 553.
See infra.
"But whether or not directors and other corporate officers are strictly trustees, there
3 FLETcH.Rt, op. cit. supra
."
can be no doubt that their character is that of a fiduciary..
note ii, §838, at 149.
In determining the fairness of the contract the fact that it may have proved an actual
loss is not strictly relevant. The test should be one of foresight. Moreover, strictly in theory,
it should be a contract which would not have been made but for the influence of the common officer, one that would not have been made with a stranger. Yet in practice such theory
is easily lost sight of. Where a contract turns out a very bad bargain, what seems more particularly hindsight view is often taken. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Co., supra note
8, in reference to the finding of unfairness in a "total needs" contract such as the corporation might easily have made with a stranger.
I See BEIUM AND MEANs, op. cit. supra note i, chapter V.
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controverted, with the result that the judgment of the court as to principle,
rather than as to the facts of the case, is acquiring increased importance. The
courts22 are thus increasingly faced with the problem of declaring a commercial
ethic.
From a practical standpoint of administration, accordingly, the rule is a
two-edged sword. By very token of its flexibility it is the more uncertain, a
difficulty which has beset corporate officer, lawyer, and judge alike. Attempts
have consequently been made to fix more definite rules by statute. Short of an
intricate system of supervision, 23 however, the same difficulty of factual variation in the way of crystallization of common-law rules and the same dilemma
of regulation versus facilitation as beset the courts have prevented legislative
action except in a few cases.24
Corporate executives, especially troubled by uncertainty as to whether any
transaction will be drawn into court, with an attendant burden on themselves
to produce evidence of its fairness, have inserted in the articles of association,
clauses, in terms varying from mild statements of the rule of the courts to
sweeping prohibitions of interference by shareholders, declaring that "no contract shall be invalid" because of a community of officers. 25 In view of their
esoteric nature, however, it seems inevitable that such provisions will be disregarded when contrary to the rule of the courts.28 Apparently it is becoming
progressively more difficult to avoid the threat of litigation except by the giving
of scrupulous evidence as to the integrity of any transaction beforehand.
While the law as to the central problem of voidability has thus gradually
settled to a determination on the basis of eventual equities, a number of related
questions have remained in a state of considerable controversy.
In certain cases the common director or official has "withdrawn" from
official capacity in connection with the transaction. Will such procedure save
the situation? It was early permitted an officer to make a contract with his
company upon making clear to his colleagues his withdrawal from his position
because of personal interest. Such dealing "at arm's length" was held to dissolve the fiduciary relationship and to relieve the officer from its application.2
'In
the average case, when the court has determined to its satisfaction) what was the
real nature and intention of the transaction its decision is an easy matter; whether or not the
intention so found is within accepted standards of business ethics is usually plain. As typical
decisions compare Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard, supra note 13, with Lazenby
v. Henderson, 241 Mass. 177, 135 N. E. 302 (1922). Difficult questions of ethics are, however, increasingly presented. So, the question of whether a common officer may withdraw
from a transaction and remain silent as to its possibilities of loss has aroused considerable
controversy among the decisions. See infra, note 29. Moreover there are difficult cases
likely to arise in which the corporation suffers no apparent loss, as in the recent Bank of
United States developments, where it was found that the directors of the bank had formed
a corporation of their own to exploit the bank's opportunities. See BEMS AND MEANS, op.

cit. supranote I, at 123, n. 3.

' See the elaborate program of state supervision of corporate transactions proposed by
Pam, supra note 8, at 480 ff.
" The most recent statutory attempt has been made in California, by which a transaction
in which an officer is adversely interested is valid if adverse interest is disclosed and a majority of disinterested directors or a majority of shareholders ratify "in good faith", or if the
transaction be fair. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 311. See Ballantine, Questions of
Policy it Drafting a Modern Corporation Law (1g31) ig CAuF. L. REv. 465, 475. The
statute, noticeably, does little else than codify the rule of the courts. Cf. W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Barnes, 1923) c. 53, § 52; COMPANiEs Acr, 8 EDw. VII (i9o8) Table A, § 77.
Numerous examples of such charter validations, some very extreme, are given in
RiP'aY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 56 ff. See Alger, supranote 5, at 730.
". . . these clauses are of very doubtful validity." BALLANTINE, supra note 24, at
475. If the clauses are to be invalidated, another individualistic concept, that of the contractual relation between the shareholders and the corporation, will necessarily be modified by
the corporate problem.
23 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note ii, § 932.
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In cases of intercorporate transactions officers, borrowing the analogy, have
abstained from voting, or have taken no part in meetings at which the transaction was discussed. Certain jurisdictions have seized upon this situation as an
opportunity for drawing a fixed rule, and have held such transactions ipso facto
valid. 28 Others, however, have realized that the control exercised by prominent
officers may easily transcend their vote, and have declared that the obligation
of a corporate officer is not satisfied by mere disclosure of adverse interest and
silence.2" The transaction must still be subjected to scrutiny under the test of
fairness.
The most vital problem related to the rule of voidability arises in regard
to the right of minority shareholders individually to procure avoidance. The
voidability rule permits a suspicious transaction to be validated by the ratification of the corporation, expressed in the majority vote of its shareholders.30
But it may readily be supposed, and is increasingly the case, that the control of
the common officers extends to a command of the majority of shares. Even
in such case, on the basis of the corporate fiction, the officer has been held to
be the fiduciary only of the corporation as a unit and not of the shareholders
individually, and, accordingly, the minority shareholder has no right of action.
This is said still to be the general rule.8 1 In the face of the unfairness of the
situation, however, even to an individualistic sense of fairness, certain courts
have pierced the corporate entity and permitted an individual shareholder
to sue.321
A study of the most modern type of corporate organization impresses with
the fact that the right of voidability in the shareholder is in any event almost
useless. The recent trend towards acquisition of shares in large corporations
by many small shareholders completely divorced from any knowledge of the
corporation's affairs prevents awareness of the transaction, much less realization
of its import.3 3 Although it has received scant attention, in the chain of protection oE the shareholder for which purpose the voidability rule is devised, this
"See the statutes quoted, supra note 24; 3 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note II, §§ 934-6.

It is not settled whether the "withdrawing" director may be present at the meeting. Id.
§ 933. See, as to the rule when it does not appear whether the officer voted or not, Ravenwood etc. Ry. Co .v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S.E. 285 (899).
' See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Co., supra note 8, at 489, 121 N. E. at 380. This
decision was apparently disapproved in Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., supra
note 13, at 19.

§ 201, at 524; Note (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv.
' SPELLIAN, CORPORATE DIRECTORS (932)
827, 828. See also citations infra, note 31.
" BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note II,§ 125, at 397; Continental Ins. Co. v. New York
etc. R. R., 187 N. Y. 225, 79 N. E. lO26 (19o7). Concerning the rule that the director is
not the fiduciary of the shareholder, see 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) § 1304, at io8i;
Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N. W. 48 (3892). An attempt to
reason the case from a basis that the officer is not the fiduciary of the shareholder seems,
when the fiduciary relation has become a mere label of the judgment of the court as to the
equities, to beg the question.
' Heffner Co. v. Gauthier, 22 Ariz. 67, 193 Pac. lO21 (92o) ; Klein v. Indep. Brewing
Ass'n, 231 Ill. 594, 83 N. E. 434 (i9o7) ; Booth v. Land Filling and Imp. Co., 68 N. J. Eq.
.536, 59 Atl. 767 (19o) ; 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note ii, § 983. Such a rule is not a mere
minor provision to take care of a remote eventuality, but under the recently developed situation of large corporations with highly diffused stock is a distinct necessity. See BERLE AND
MEANS, op. cit. supra note I, at 84 ff., for a striking exposition of the technique of management control by virtue of its command of the proxy machinery. Of the 2oo largest corporations, the majority are so controlled.
'- Most impressive of the insignificance and impotence of the individual shareholder is
the revelation by BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note I, chapter V, of the complete diffusion of stockholdings in the contemporary corporate giant. The one possible mobilizing
device, the proxy machinery, is completely in the hands of the management. The great
majority of cases coming to the courts have arisen from relatively small corporations, in
which shareholders' actual participation in the corporate affairs is most possible. But such
smaller companies are rapidly becoming insignificant in the rapid course of absorption of
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is the weakest link. Yet no means of amelioration is apparent. The legislatures
have shrunk from any scheme of supervision, and the courts have accordingly
been powerless to do more in the long run than trust the corporate officer and
to stigmatize unfair dealing when brought before them. But it is increasingly
the fact that it is only on liquidation that the suspicious transaction is discovered
and makes its way into the courts, with a consequently impaired redress in spite
of preferences.
Highly vital also, and equally unsettled, is the problem, what are to be the
rights of creditors? 3 4 Under the corporate fiction it has been asserted that
there being no fiduciary relation between officers and creditors the latter can
have no concern with the type of transaction in question unless there is shown
to be an actual fraud on creditors. 3" In other words, as to creditors the transaction is no less valid than any normal transaction with unrelated parties. Yet,
as noticed above, there is by no means reason to assume that any unfair transaction will necessarily be upset by shareholders, and the creditors seem in many
respects the more likely parties to discover and contest the deal than the shareholders themselves. In the case of a solvent corporation there is perhaps reason
for looking upon an action by creditors against a transaction of which the
shareholders have not complained as unwarranted interloping. This complexion
of the matter would seem to be altered, however, where the corporation is
insolvent, or where, even when solvent, it is controlled by one man or a clique
to the detriment of the interest of the corporation and necessarily also, of the
security upon which creditors have relied.
In certain decisions it has been held, in the event of insolvency, to be
36
There
within the duty of corporate officers to preserve assets for the creditors.
would seem to be no reason why this concept should not be extended to permit
the avoidance by creditors of transactions dangerous to their security before
insolvency occurs. The permitting of watchfulness thereby, on the part of
those who are in relatively close contact with the corporation, would appear to
be to the best interest of the more remote shareholders. In a few cases, however, where the corporation was at the time of the transaction insolvent, the
creditor has been allowed3 7to succeed on the theory of voidability of the transaction for adverse interest.
industry into the large corporate structure. The most practical relief apparent lies in publicity, through constant publication of accounts and through various checking agencies such
as the listing committees of stock exchanges. It has been suggested that trust companies
offer their services as representatives for a large number of stockholders, giving them a
commanding position from which to make investigation, and an economically profitable basis
for operation. See BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 37.
"When there is a definite fraud upon creditors by means of a transaction marked by
interlocking officers, it is generally possible to impute knowledge to the corporation benefited,
and it is in this form that such cases are usually cast, the voidability rule not being called
into question. So, where A corporation owned most of the stock of B corporation, one individual being president and director of each, and the A corporation while insolvent made substantial payments on a debt due the subsidiary, notice of insolvency and the consequent fraud
on creditors was imputed to the subsidiary by virtue of the common officer's knowledge
thereof. In re Henwood & Nowak, 27 F. (2d) 888 (D. Mass. 1928). See (1932) 8o U. OF PA.
L. REv. ioi9; Dicker v. Italo-American Oil Corp., 3I9 Cal. App. 451, 6 P. (2d) 55o (1931);
discussion of imputed knowledge, infra.
" O'Conner Min. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., supra note 9 (in spite of the strict prophylactic rule applied in Alabama at the instance of the corporation; on the ground that the
officers were not trustees for creditors) ; Stone v. Rottman, 183 Mo. 552, 82 S. W. 76 (i9o4);
Webb. v. Cash, 35 Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. i (1926).
" Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789 (i929) ; City Nat. Bank v.
Goshen Co., 35 Ind. App. 562, 69 N. E. 2o6 (i9o3) ; Mica Products Co. v. Heath, 8i N. H.
470, 128 Atl. 805 (1925).
Heim v. Jobes, 14 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Sweeney v. Sugar Refining Co.,
3o W. Va. 443, 4 S. E. 431 (887) (transaction presumptively fraudulent because of interlocking directorate, not only to the corporation, but as well to creditors).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Most harassing of all are the variety of unique problems presented by the
situation of the common officer in relation to the doctrine of imputed knowledge.
None of the infinite variety of fact possible through the corporate structure is
lost in this regard. Two corporations may fraudulently contract with each
other; one corporation may contract with a third party as to which dealing an
officer may have peculiar knowledge owing to his official capacity in a second
corporation not immediately party to the transaction. In either case, fraud may
be attempted upon the party sought to be charged with notice, upon the party
seeking to have the other so charged, or upon a party not at all involved in the
transaction. 8 To the endless array of factual situations thus made possible,
the courts have sought to apply the individualistic rule that an agent's knowledge
which his duty requires him to communicate to his principal is to be imputed
to the latter.3 9 The result, as in the attempt to apply agency rules to the question
of voidability of contracts, has resulted in much confusion, many hard results,
and an inevitable exceeding of the analogy thus drawn.
Confusion, moreover, has resulted from differences of opinion among the
courts, sensing a difference between the corporation and an individual principal,
as to how specially to treat the corporate structure. Thus a corporation may
be regarded as a device for profit which avoids all responsibility if knowledge
be not constructively charged. Consequently, notice is imputed wherever possible, for the sake of securing an approximation of the centralized legal responsibility of the individual principal. 40 The same corporation, from another viewpoint, may be considered as in fact a highly decentralized organization, to charge
which, as an entity, with the knowledge of all its highly specialized officers would
be unfair to the shareholders whose investment has made possible a highly useful
engine of industry.4 ' Such a difference of opinion is largely the inarticulate
basis of many of the conflicting results presented.
It has been sought to apply the rule of imputed knowledge to the case of
a transaction negotiated by a common officer.42 Such an application would seem
still to be technically possible as a means of arriving at an eventually equitable
result where one corporation seeks to retain, through the transaction, a benefit
it would not have obtained otherwise than by its officer's fraud upon the other
company.4 3 Where, however, no benefit is gained, where adequate value is
'In any case, likewise, the common officer may possess any degree of dominance in
either corporation; may be in any conceivable degree personally interested in the success of
the fraud practiced; may or may not be called upon to act officially in the transaction.
"For the rules of agency, see AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) §§ 497-507;
2 MECHEm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 18o2 ff.
' Orme v. Baker, 74 Ohio St. 337, 354, 78 N. E. 439, 444 (19o6) ; 3 THomPsoN, CoPoRAiIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 1755.
" See the plea for leniency with banks in regard to constructive notice of breach of
trust, Scott, Participationin Breach of Trust, (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 454, 480. The same
appreciation of the complexity of the corporate structure as preventing the circulation of
information applies in some measure in the case of actual knowledge of fraud. It is particularly in keeping with the attitude taken by some courts, that the rule of imputation is based
upon a presumption that communication occurred. See 2 MECHEM, op. Cit. supra note 4, § 1816.
Though for the most part inarticulate, it is no doubt the basis of many of the lenient decisions
noted below.
See 2 MECHEm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1825.
Edward Hines Western Pines Co. v. First National Bank of Chicago, 61 F. (2d) 503
(C. C. A 7th, 1932). So also the rule is suited to the charging of knowledge of a preference
in fraud of creditors. See cases cited supra note 34. Even in this situation, however, certain courts, probably recognizing the artificiality of the rule, approach a result rather from a
consideration of the equities involved. In State of Ohio v. City Auto Stamping Co., Court
of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, decided February 15, 1932, where a common officer
of a bank and of the defendant company withdrew the latter's account because of his knowledge as officer of the bank of its imminent failure, the transaction was avoided because of a
"paramount duty" owed by the officer to the bank. See also Leach v. Beazley, 201 Iowa 337,
2o7 N. W. 374 (1926). This approach is criticized for its uncertainty in (1932) 8o U. oF PA.
L. REv. 1O19.
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exchanged, or where the two corporations are simply used as mechanisms for
the perpetration of the officer's personal fraud, the charging of one company
would scarcely seem to be logically consistent with a failure to charge the other.
The result has necessarily been the desertion of the doctrine of imputed notice4
and the allocation of the loss from a pure consideration of the eventual equities."
The agency analogy has further become difficult in regard to the legitimacy
of the charging of knowledge obtained by an officer while acting officially for
another corporation. The corporate form has here inserted peculiarities of its
own into an already difficult agency problem." Granting that a corporation is
highly decentralized, acting through a considerable number of specialized officers
who may have any number of other corporate relationships, is it fair to charge
it with knowledge gained from, and circulating in the officer's mind with especial
regard to such other relationships? One recent case has apparently led to the
conclusion that it is not fair. Avoiding any mention of agency theory, it was
held that "an officer in several companies does not in every act represent each
and all of the companies", and that "the interest of each corporation had a
distinct and different origin", even though they were equally interested in the
success of the transaction. The court refused to impute to one company knowledge gained while its officer was acting for another." Any attempt to relieve
the corporation on this score appears, however, justifiably to be repudiated by
equally recent decisions.17

Another question of particular difficulty with regard to the corporate situation arises from the exception to the rule of imputation where the agent's
interests are "adverse" to those of his principal. Probably no question involved
is embraced by so great confusion as the problem of what constitutes such
adversity of interest. The agency rule is itself visited by much dissension,
which is further complicated by bewilderment as to how far the corporation
should be treated as the individual principal. 48 A recent case refused to charge
a corporation with the knowledge of its dominant officer on the ground that
"This was the approach of Gunster v. The Scranton Illuminating Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37
Ati. 55o (1897). See 2 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, § I82O.
'There is a conflict among the cases as to whether knowledge gained by an agent in
another capacity is imputable. 2 MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1805; 3 FLErcna, op. cit.
supra note iI, § 798.
0A corporation was a heavy depositor in an insolvent bank. Its president and treasurer
were president and cashier of the bank and large owners of shares therein. The corporation
made a loan to the bank on the indorsement of the defendants, who were also large shareholders of the bank. The indorsement was obtained by misrepresentations as to the soundness of the bank made by the common officers. Knowledge of the misrepresentations was not
imputed to the corporation. Farmers' Life Ins. Ass'n v. Fristad, 241 N. W. 352 (Wis. 1932).
Apparently the attempt was made to segregate entirely the knowledge of a corporate officer
representing at various times a number of companies into separate compartments depending
upon which interest he is serving at the time.
17A bank president made a loan to a trustee in return for a mortgage of trust property,
which he later discovered the trustee had no power to give. Later, as vice-president of a
mortgage corporation, he made a loan on a similar mortgage, the proceeds to be used to pay
the debt to the bank. The knowledge gained by him as president of the bank was imputed
to the mortgage company. First Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Yancey, 139 So. 597 (Fla. 1932).
Accord: Archibald Hardware Co. v. Gifford, 163 S. E. 254 (Ga. App. 1932). There is no
apparent reason why knowledge so acquired should not be imputed as readily as knowledge
obtained as officer of the company sought to be charged. The corporation would expect
knowledge learned elsewhere to be used for its benefit. Any fixed rule to the contrary would
in many cases do violence to the equities.
eventually
's The difference in opinion as to what constitutes adverse interest can be
traced to a difference in opinion as to whether the rule of imputation has its origin in a presumption of communication or in an identification of the principal with the agent for reasons
of policy, and as to whether imputation is denied in case of adversity of interest because it
destroys such a presumption or that it is completely inconsistent with identification of interests. See 2 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, H8 i805, 18o6.
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he was acting primarily for another corporation in fraud of a third party,
although not inconsistently with the interest of the first. 45 Other contemporary
cases have held that an ulterior interest is not adverse where not inconsistent
with representation of the corporation sought to be charged.50 A number of
decisions, in the interest of achieving central responsibility, have charged the
corporation with knowledge of its officer, even though his interest be considered
"adverse", where the officer is the corporation's "sole representative". 51 Any
crystallization appears to do violence to possible factual situations, and, therefore, this problem, as others, would seem to be eventually a question for a
decision purely on the equities under the particular facts.52
Still more thoroughly colored by peculiarities of the corporate form is the
situation in which the officer, acquiring knowledge of the fraudulent character
of a transaction and knowing of its occurrence, is not officially engaged therein.
Under a strict application of the agency rule, imputation would seem to be
impossible."2 Even so, the continuous general relation of certain officers to
their corporations as advisers, even though not engaged in particular acts, would
seem to justify the charging of the corporation where they have been derelict
in this obligation. Apparently, however, such imputation has occurred only in
the case of presidents with very wide managerial powers.5 4 In the case of
directors, 5 of more specialized officers, and of mere shareholders, imputation
has been consistently denied.58 It would seem, nevertheless, that situations may
be presented in which the officer's position of dominance, actual closeness of
contact, and the nature of the harm to the party defrauded would5 7render the
charging of the corporation proper, and a rigid rule still inadequate.
" Cheek v. Squires, 2oo N. C. 661, 158 S. E. 198 (ig3i). A was general manager of X
corporation and treasurer of Y corporation. Y corporation had foreclosed on certain prop-

erty, not paying off certain bonds secured by the mortgage. To sell the property it was
necessary to finance a purchase, and X corporation took a mortgage from the purchaser.
The knowledge of A was not imputed to the X company on the ground that it was to his
interest as an officer of Y that no disclosure be made. The case is approved in (1932) io
N. C. L. REv. 68 on the ground that the presumption of communication was destroyed. It is
supported by cases going on the presumption theory. See Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 139 Mass. 332, I N. E. 282 (1885). But see 2 MEcHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1420,
n. 77, disapproving so broad a rule.
' First Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Yancey; Archibald Hardware Co. v. Gifford, both
supra note 47, where there was such personal interest of the officer in the fraud as would
destroy the presumption of communication. See also Edward Hines Western Pines Co. v.
First Nat. Bank of Chicago, supra note 43; Live Oak Cemetery Co. v. Adamson, io6 Cal.
App. 783, 288 Pac. 29 (2930).
' Little Red River Levee Dist. v. Garrett, 154 Ark. 76, 242 S. W. 555 (1922) ; First Nat.
Bank ir. Bums, 88 Ohio St. 434, 1o3 N. E. 93 (1913); Note (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. s.) 558;
Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 764. The "sole representative" rule is based on the fact
that the eventually responsible officer has the knowledge, and there is no one to whom he
might communicate it. However, a given interest may nevertheless be so adverse-as fraud
on the corporation-that imputation would do violence to the identification theory. But see
MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1825.
See Goldstein v. Union Nat. Bank, iog Tex. 555, 213 S. W. 584 (1919). The rule of
Cheek v. Squires, supra note 49, would thus seem an inadequate crystallization.
0 The officer is not acting as agent. 2 MECHEM, op cit. supra note 4, § 1831.
54Pollman v. Curtice, 255 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) ; Fouch6 v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
iO Ga. 827, 36 S. E. 256 (1900) ; 3 FLErcHFR, op. cit. supra, note ii, § 811.
Deposit Co. v. Courtney, 186 U. S. 342, 22 Sup. Ct. 833 (19Ol) ; Farmers'
5'Fidelity
Nat. Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444 (1856); Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, 34
N. E. 9o8 (1893). By some decisions notice to a single director is never imputable to his
corporation. See 3 THOMsPSON, op. cit. supra note 40, §§ 1787-90.
0 See 3 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 40, §§ 1787-90.
'7 In a given case in which a director knows perfectly well of a transaction and of its
fraudulent character as to a third party, and simply stays away from board meeting, it would
appear highly inequitable to refuse to impute knowledge to the corporation, which may thus
make a profit at the expense of the defrauded party. If it be asked where the line is to be
drawn, it would not seem inconsistent with the tendency to reduce to basic equities to apply
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A unique question is presented where the property transferred is negotiable
paper, and the corporation sought to be charged with knowledge is a bank. In
such case, in addition to whatever reason persuasive of leniency in view of the
decentralized character of the corporation, there is the interest in promoting
the negotiability of paper.58 The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, designed to free
the bank of constructive notice of small mechanical details often known only
in part by separate agents, still permits the charging of notice where an officer
of the bank has actual knowledge of fraud.5 9 Considering the likelihood of
the association of bank officers with other corporations, such a problem bids
fair to become one of the most prevalent in the field of imputed notice. It is
precisely in the banking cases, however, that the rule as to adverse interest is
most liberal. And it is in these cases, also, that the requirement that the officer
take official part in the transaction is most strict.6
Considering how technical
the latter requirement may become, it seems that the failure to charge is in
many cases neither equitable nor desirable in any view of policy."
A further departure from the rule applied to the average corporation is
presented where a bank assists in the transfer of funds from one corporation to
another by an officer known to be common to both. It has been held that the
bank is obliged to inquire into the bona fides of the transaction. 2 Apparently,
however, the especial favor shown the bank in the interest of negotiability operates, under the recent trend of authority, to release it from any such burden."3
From an interpretative point of view, this relatively limited segment of
corporation law has proved an indicator of the significant effect produced by
the introduction of the corporate structure into the concepts of the common
law. It reveals rather strikingly, in its history, how sensitively in their reaction
to the corporation the courts have shadowed the quixotic changes of general
public opinion. 64 From an attitude of unmistakable hostility, the judicial mind
has followed the public attitude through periods of hesitation, of recurrent
opposition, of awed suspension of judgment, of even genial facilitation, to one
showing signs of renewed hesitation. If the contemporary judicial attitude
seems largely one of tolerance in bewilderment, it would seem rather because
a more definite public opinion has not yet been made manifest.,
Of more strictly legal interest, perhaps, is the even more significant demonstration provided of the collapse of the theoretical apparatus of a system of
law built upon individualistic capitalism when its application is attempted to
the rule of imputation to any officer of such general duties and whose information is sufficiently important, that were it to the corporation's interest communication would be expected.
r3 See Scott, supranote 41, at 480.
9 U. L. A. (1932) 147, § 7-9. So also, § 56 of the N. I. L. BRANNAN, NEGOTIADLE
INSTRUMENTS LA.W ANNOTATED (Beutel, 1932) 572.
1 See 3 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 40, § 1780-1786; 3 FIrnER, op. cit. supra note

11, §828.

c Note 57, supra, applies. There is no interest in promoting the negotiability of instruments when fraud is known.
"Niagara Woolen Co v. Pacific Bank, 141 App. Div. 265, 126 N. Y. Supp. 89o (Igio).
Approved in (IgII) 24 HA v. L. REV. 496. Disapproved, McCollom, Liability of Banks
Receiving Checks to a Trustee's Order (1911) 11 Coi. L. REV. 428. The situation was
apparently presented in Wen Kroy Realty Co. v. Public Nat. Bank, 183 N. E. 73 (N. Y.
1932), but was not argued.
"Bank not held to duty of inquiry: In re Troy and Cohoes Shirt Co., 136 Fed. 420
(N. D. N. Y. 1905); Hill Syrup Co. v. American Say. Bank & Trust Co., 133 Wash. 5oi,
234 Pac. 11 (1925). The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, supra note 59, § 9, releases a bank from
the duty of inquiry where the trustee pays to his own account. The same desire to free the
bank from the burdensome necessity of checking scattered details-see Scott, supra note 41,
480 ff.-would seem to be appropriate here when there is no knowledge of actual fraud.
c4For a resum6 of the varying public attitudes in the course of corporate development,
see RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 20 ff.
mSee BmL AND MRANs, op. cit. supra note I, at 352 ff.
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the organized unit of collective capitalism, with its highly specialized and intertwined agencies, almost autonomous directorates, remote ownership, and infinite
capacity for factual variation. The trust analogy and the agency analogy have
rapidly been demonstrated inadequate in relation to the question of the validity
of transactions. The corporate fiction has been found too confining. Virtually
every rule of imputation of notice has been thrown into question by the unique
problems of decentralization and irresponsibility arising. Most painful of all, the
possibility of factual variation with consequent transmutation of the equities
involved has prevented the drawing of any ready, fixed rules.
The result has noticeably been the dropping of individualistic concepts, a
falling back upon examination of the equities involved in each set of facts, and
the application of a test of fairness, which even though it remain at present individualistic, is nevertheless eventual. Just as the product of this metamorphosis
has been a necessary flexibility, it has also been a welter of confusion, the inevitable consequence of factual variety.
Moreover, just as its technical apparatus has fallen, so the common law
itself, conceived and nourished under individualism, has failed as an efficient
means of affording adequate protection to the rights of shareholders, and as
a means of regulating the corporate form in accordance with a clear social
policy.66 Just so, however, the very process which has caused the desertion of
old crystallizations has, in reducing very nearly all questions involved to a bare
test of equity as the court sees it, made more possible the development of a new
system of legal control over the corporation, which, it seems not altogether
will be an approach from a point of view social rather than
fanciful to conceive,
67
individualistic.

G. W.

INHERITANcE

TAXATION

OF INTEREST OF NON-RESIDENT

0.

MORTGAGEE-

During the last decade the development in the law of taxation, viewed from the
aspect of state sovereignty, has been rapid. Taxes have been declared invalid
which prior to this time were always considered proper.1 The underlying problem
has been the constitutionality of double taxation. Since the Supreme Court has
not gone so far as to label double taxation inherently bad, one can only speculate
as to the ultimate disposition of situations not expressly adjudicated. Interesting
among the unanswered questions is whether an inheritance tax can be imposed
on the interest of a non-resident mortgagee by both the state of his donicil and
the state where the land is located.
Perhaps the most tangible result of the modern voidability rule, in the light of its inadequate protection of the shareholder discussed above, is the placing of unquestioned control
of the large corporations in the hands of the corporate managers, in practical effect free from
legal supervision. The prophylactic rule was at least the product of a definite policy of regulation. Under the modern law, ". . . the economic power now mobilized and massed under
the corporate form in the hands of . . . the few hundred individuals is simply handed over,
weakly, to the present administrators with a pious wish that something nice will come out of
it all." Berle, For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365.
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
6 See the interesting and significant exchange:
Trust (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. lO49; Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate M1fanagers Trustees?
(1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1145; Berle, supra note 66. "The future may see the economic
organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on a par with the state, but possibly even
superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state,
while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship."
BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note i, at 356.
'This development is reviewed in Note (1932)

81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 177, 179-183.

NOTES
The most significant and first in the line of these recent decisions is that of
Frick v. Pennsylvania,2 holding that the old rule of mobilia sequuntur personam
is not a doctrine to be applied any longer to tangible personal property, and that
such chattels may have their situs apart from the owner and are taxable only at
that situs. A few years later the distinction between tangibles and intangibles,
so far as subjection to double taxation was concerned, was erased by a holding
that such obligations are taxable only at the domicil of the creditor.3 The last
step taken in this march of the law was that made when the Supreme Court in
the now famous case of First National Bank of Boston v. Maine 4 decided to
exempt from taxation shares of stock owned by a non-resident in corporations
organized in the taxing state. Of most value to the proposition under scrutiny
here, however, is the decision in Baldwin v. Missouri." A resident of Illinois died
owning notes located in Missouri, given by citizens of that state and secured by
mortgages on land located there. It was held that Missouri could not impose an
inheritance tax on these notes; that the imposition of such a tax was a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case definitely
located the state where the intangible was taxable and excluded taxation by the
state of the debtor, even though that was also the location of the evidences of
the debt.'
Having been thwarted in the attempt to tax the transfer of the debt, will the
state where the mortgaged land is located now attempt to tax the transfer of the
interest of the mortgagee in the land at his death? If such a tax is allowed what
effect will this have on the power of the state of the domicil of the mortgagee to
tax the transfer of the interest? In Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion 7 in the
Baldwin case, he questions the overruling by that case of numerous decisions.
One of those mentioned is Savings Society v. Multnomah County.8 In that case
a resident of Oregon delivered certain notes to a resident of California and gave
as security for these notes mortgages on land located in Oregon and duly recorded
there. The documents were located thereafter at the domicil of the creditor in
California. This creditor filed a bill against the tax collector of Oregon to enjoin
him from selling the land on which the mortgages were given after the refusal
of the complainant to pay a tax levied on the mortgage by Oregon. It was claimed
that this tax was a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute in question declared that a mortgage when given as security
for a debt should be "deemed and treated as land or real property". It did not
tax the value of the land twice but provided for the deduction of the value of
the interest of the mortgagee from any assessment upon the mortgagor. The tax
-268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 6o3 (1925).
'Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (193o), overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (903). Almost contemporaneosly
with this decision it was held in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83, 5o Sup.
Ct. 59 (1929) that stocks and bonds held by trustees of one state are not subject to an inheritance tax by the domiciliary state of the beneficiaries of that trust. This decision is the
forerunner of the later decisions on intangibles. Just as the Frick case refused to apply
mobilia sequnitur personam, so this court held the "personam" to be the legal, not the equitable title holder.
A284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932) ; Lowndes, The Passing of Situs-Jursdiction to
Tax Shares of CorporateStock (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 777.
'281 U. S. 586, 5o Sup. Ct. 436 (193o), overruling Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 435, 34
Sup. Ct. 607 (1914). For a closely allied case see Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. I, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930). See also Buck v. Beach, 2o6 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct.
712 (19o7) holding in accord that mere physical presence of notes within a state confers no
authority on that state to impose a tax.
INote (930) 43 Hmnv. L. REv. 792; Note (1930) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 93; Peppin, The
Power of the States to Tax Intangibles or Their Transfer (193o) 18 CAT L. REv. 638.
7 Supra note 5, at 596, 5o Sup. Ct. at 439.
8169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392 (1898).
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was held valid on the ground that the mortgagee's interest, being real estate in
the state of Oregon, was properly taxable there. It is to be noted that this was
not a case of inheritance taxation, but the same considerations are involved
whether the tax is direct or indirect.
The majority opinion in the Baldwin case expressly states that this is not
such a situation upon which the court was asked to pass judgment.9 Strictly all
that this case holds is that notes secured by mortgages on land located in the
taxing state are not taxable there merely because the notes are situated there or
because the security is located in that place. The distinction between the theory
of a tax on the debt and a tax on the security for that debt must be remembered.
The Multnomah County decision clearly limits the issue to the taxation of the
security and not of the debt. 10 Thus it would seem that there are two jurisdictions-the state where the land is located and the domicil of the creditor mortgagee-taxing the estate of the latter to the amount of the mortgage transaction.
The first jurisdiction taxes the transfer of the decedent's interest in the transaction as if it were an interest in the real estate of that state, for to call it taxation of the debt would, under the Baldwin case, be to defeat its own ends. On
the other hand, the state of the domicil of the deceased mortgagee taxes the
transfer of the debtor-creditor relationship. It is obvious that it could not tax
the transaction as representing the mortgagee's interest in the land for land outside the state is not the proper subject of taxation. Each state is in effect taxing the same transaction but on a different theory.
When the situation does arise the Supreme Court will be faced with two
propositions: (i) Is double taxation of the interest of the mortgagee by the
domicil of the mortgagee and also by the state where the mortgaged land is located
so repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment as to be prohibited? (2) If so,
which of the two states is entitled to tax this interest?
What factors will determine the solution to the first question? Does each
state have an equal right to tax? The jurisdiction of a state to tax normally
depends upon the degree of control which it exerts in its sovereign capacity over
the thing or interest to be taxed. Taxation of a mortgage presents conflicting
considerations. A mortgage is often familiarly described as an interest in land
and such a description is borne out by the holding of the Multnoalh County
case. For many practical purposes, however, it is personal property in the hands
of the mortgagee."- It has been held that the Statute of Frauds has no application
to bar the creation of a trust in a mortgage by parol.. 2 The mortgage interest,
in all states, descends on the death of the mortgagee to his administrator 13 or
executor who has power to assign the mortgage:" or to continue a suit of foreclosure begun in the lifetime of the deceased mortgagee. 5 Similarly, a mort0281 U. S. at 594, 50 Sup. Ct. at 439: "This cause does not involve the right of a State

to tax either the interest which a mortgagee as such may have in lands lying therein, or the
transfer of that interest."

10169 U. S. at 425, 18 Sup. Ct. at 396. To same effect see Chambers, State Inheritance
Tax on Foreign Held Bonds or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on Land in the State (1926)
12 CORN. L. Q. 172, 178; Peppin, op cit. supra note 6, at 658; Note (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L.
Q. 728, 732. The Multnomah County case is not to be confused with State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 300 (1872) which was a tax levied not on the security for the debt but
on the interest payable on bonds secured by a mortgage. It was held that the bonds held by
non-residents of the taxing state were not subject to such a tax. But see Carpenter, Juris-

diction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 905, 929.
n2 JONES, MORTGAGES § 866 (1928) ; 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 516 (903).
"Estate of Hart, 187 Wis. 629, 205 N. W. 386 (925).

" Baldwin v. Hatchett, 56 Ala. 461 (1876). This is true even though Alabama is a title
state, the legal title descending to the heirs who hold it in trust for the administrator.
"[McCauseland v. Baltimore Humane Society, 95 Md. 741, 52 Atl. 918 (19o2).
'Haines

v. Kent Circuit Judge, 155 Mich. 417, 119 N. W. 439 (1909).
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gage has been held subject to inheritance taxation by the domiciliary state even
though the mortgaged land is located in another state. 16 The right of a mortgagee to foreclose the equity of redemption in a foreign state 17 and the right
to bring ejectment I are also indications of the amount of control exerted by a
state over the interests involved in this situation.
Once having used the above factors in determining the desirability of double
taxation, practically the same ones will be considered in determining which of the
two states should be allowed to tax. Again the problem is one of control. Two
of the above considerations, the holdings that the state of the mortgaged land can
tax the interest of the mortgagee and that the death of the non-resident mortgagee subjects his mortgage to an inheritance tax at his domicil, must, however,
be eliminated. To use these in determining the second point would be to beg the
question, since the validity of these holdings will depend upon the answer to the
second question.
Nor will the answer to this second question be influenced by the fact that
the particular state in which the mortgage is given is a so-called "title state" or
"lien state". Although in a "lien state" the mortgage is considered as merely
20
security for the debt, 9 it is nevertheless personalty for the purposes of taxation.
In the "title states" which still retain the vestiges of the old common law attitude
toward a mortgage and regard it as a conveyance of the property, it operates as
a conveyance only as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 21 As to the rest
of the world the title is regarded as still vested in the mortgagor. It is plain
therefore that for taxing purposes, except by special statute, the mortgagee's
interest must be regarded as the same as in "lien states". In some states a doctrine in between the other two views prevails-that the mortgagor is the actual
owner of the land, even against the mortgagee, until a default occurs, at which
passes to the mortgagee for the purpose of enabling him to satisfy
moment title
22
his claim.

If the Supreme Court decides that the interest of the mortgagee is more
nearly an interest in the real property in the state of the mortgaged land, it would
seem to follow that the latter state should be given the exclusive power to tax
the non-resident mortgagee's interest, assuming of course that the Court has first
decided that double taxation in this situation is undesirable. The obvious reason
is that a state may not tax realty outside of its borders. If the interest of the
mortgagee is considered subject to more control by the law of his domicil than
by the law of the state where the land is located, the Court may be willing to
label the interest a personal interest, one which is separate from the land. If this
is so, it will then be a problem whether this personal interest is so analogous to
" Lewis's Estate, 2o3 Pa. 211, 52 Atl. 205 (19o2). It should be noted that the cases so
holding speak in terms of "mortgage' and "mortgage security" but fail to distinguish between
the debt and the interest in land.
I Paget v. Ede, L. !M 18 Eq. I18 (1874).
28 Elk Garden Co. v. Thayer Co., I79 Fed. 556 (C. C. W. D. Va. 191o).
"An exhaustive discussion of the lien theory may be found in Lloyd, Mortgages-The
Genesis of the Lien Theory (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 233. See also Lloyd, The Mortgage Theory
in Pennsylvania (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 43; Note (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 269.
1 The lien theory is of statutory origin. Typical cases involving the doctrine are: Johnson v. Razez, 181 Cal. 342, 184 Pac. 657 (1919) ; Phillips v. Bond, 132 Ga. 413, 64 S. E. 456

(igog) ; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser,
=Bonstein v. Schweyer,

212

179

Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37

(1912).

Pa. 19, 6I Atl. 447 (19o5) ; Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass.

547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923) ; see George's Creek Coal Co. v. Detmold, i Md. 225, 237 (I85)
(where mortgagor was allowed to recover in ejectment against a third party). See JONa-s,
op. cit. supra note II, § 67.
= Hall v. Tunnell, i Houst. 320 (Del. 1857) (mortgagor cannot sue mortgagee in ejectment after default) ; Buck v. Payne, 52 Miss. 271 (1876) ; Springfield v. Ransdell, 3o5 Mo.
43, 264 S. W. 771 (1924).
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the tangible personal property involved in Frick v. Pennsylvania28 that 4it can
2
be taxed at its situs only. What that situs will be raises another problem.
County
the
Multnomh
of
theory
If the interest is declared to be realty, the
decision will be extended to transfers at death, and decisions 25 that the interest of
the mortgagee is subject at his death to an inheritance tax by the state of his
domicil will be overruled.
In McCurdy v. McCurdy,21 the question arose under an inheritance tax
statute as to whether land in Massachusetts owned by a non-resident decedent
should be taxed at its full value or whether the value of the mortgage should be
deducted. It was held that only the equity of redemption was taxable. The next
case to arise was one in which the executor of a non-resident mortgagee filed a
bill to discover what tax, if any, he should pay. The court held it necessary, after
residuethe preceding case, to say that the mortgagee was only taxable for the
27
the value of the land less the equity of redemption of the mortgagor.
In Romaine's Estate,2" a New York statute imposed a transfer tax on "all
the property which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state . . .
or, if such decedent was not a resident of this state at the time of his death, which
property or any part thereof shall be within this state." It was held that a mortgage on land located in New York, but owned by a resident of Virginia, was
subject to this statute.
In relation to the problem of taxation of the debt it has been said:
"Starting de novo the question would naturally arise whether in this
bundle of legal rights represented by a bond or note and mortgage there was
any property or interest in property in the state? Does the non-resident
decedent own any interest in any sort of property in the state. where the
mortgaged land is situated .

.

. Put in this way the answer seems clear:

the bond or note holder has by reason of the mortgage an interest in the
mortgaged land. Whether the interest be security title as it is in some states
or a security lien as it is in others he has an interest in the res. That interest
I Supra note 2.
A very similar problem arises in the case of equitable conversion. In Land Title &
Trust Co. v. Tax Commission, 131 S.C. I92, 126 S.E. 189 (1924) South Carolina attempted
to levy an inheritance tax on the transfer of land located in Pennsylvania. The decedent,
domiciled in South Carolina, in his will directed the sale of the land and payment of the
proceeds to certain legatees. The taxing authorities claimed that the land by the rule of
equitable conversion became personalty, the transfer of which South Carolina could tax.
The court agreed and upheld the tax, saying that ir doing so it was applying the law of
Pennsylvania on equitable conversion. Since Frick v. Pennsylvania, the rule in Pennsylvania
has been changed in Robinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 308, 132 Atl. 127; (925) 25 MIcH. L. Rv.
84, the court believing that since chattels outside the state could not be taxed, no tax could
be laid in the above situation. This led to a holding that land within the state was not subject to the rule of equitable conversion and therefore taxable. Commonwealth v. Presbyterian Hospital, 287 Pa. 49, 134 Atl. 427 (1926) ; (1925) 25 Micn. L. Rav. 204. It is suggested that before the Frick decision Pennsylvania would have been more correct if it had
done what South Carolina did and applied the rule of the state where the land was located,
and if equitable conversion did not prevail there, the land was not taxable. Since the Frick
case the result is the samd in all situations whether the property outside is personalty or
realty by the law in that state.
However, the problem at hand differs somewhat. It depends on whether the legislature
of a state can compel a neighboring state to recognize a statute declaring the mortgagee's
interest to be realty.
'Supra note 16.
0 197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881 (19o8).
21Kinney v. Treasurer, 207 Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586 (191o) ; GooDRIcH, CoNxMtrs oF
LAws (927) § 58; Chambers, supra note 1O; Note (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REV. 595.
8 127 N. Y. 8o,27 N. E. 759 (1891).

NOTES
being an interest within the state would be subject to the taxing power and
hence subject to a property and inheritance tax." 29
Due to the fact that the mortgagee can bring ejectment only where the land is
situated and that the latter state can sell the land over the head of the mortgagee
for property taxes which the mortgagor has allowed to fall into arrears, this
conclusion has much to support it.
In testing such a conclusion, analogies to other decisions of the Supreme
Court are not very helpful. The problem in these other situations, as in
Baldwin z. Missouri, has been whether the state of the creditor or that of the
debtor should have jurisdiction to tax. Although the state of the creditor has
apparently gained the battle, the point under discussion, the taxation of the
interest of the mortgagee, is not a case where the Supreme Court can say as it
did in State Tax on ForeignHeld Bonds230 and Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v.
Minnesota-31 that a debt can have no locality apart from its owner. It will be
faced with the conflicting claims of one state asserting the right to tax the interest
as an interest in land and the other the right to tax as an interest in personalty.
The answer will probably be determined by the economic views with which the
2
In Farmers"
Court regards the particular set of legal relations presented to it3
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, Mr. Justice McReynolds intimated that intangibles are taxable at the domicil of the owner but in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v.
Virginia he preferred situs.3 3 The designation of the situs of these quasi inter-

ests in land and the jurisdiction on which the power to tax will be conferred will
probably vary with the "size of the Lord Chancellor's foot" in reaction to the
legal relations presented.
The larger problem raised by the point under discussion is whether the
Supreme Court will decide to eliminate double taxation in this situation. Do the
same considerations which have induced it to eliminate it in other situations compel
it to do so here? Chief among the missiles aimed against double taxation has
been the unfairness to the one taxed,. 4 who has been made to pay so much in certain instances as to minimize greatly the benefit of inheritance. Double taxation
at 186. See also Beale, Jurisdictionto Tax (1918) 32 HAv.
Chambers, supra note IO,
L. REv. 587, 596: "If there is no special statute, only the ordinary provision for taxing' all
real and personal property within the state, the courts, following the ordinary practice and
the provisions of the common law, will tax the land at its full value as the property of the
mortgagor, since he owns the predominant, though not necessarily the largest, interest in it.
The land having once been taxed at its full value, there is ndthing left to tax except the debt
it secures; and if the debt is due to a non-resident it is not within the jurisdiction. But by
an express statutory provision dividing the land for purposes of taxation between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, it is possible for the sovereign to tax the interest of the nonresident mortgagee in the land, though the debt itself cannot be reached."
C82 U. S. 300 (1872) which quoted from People v. Eastman, 25 Cal. 6oi, 603 (1864),
"The mortgage has no existence independent of the thing secured by it; a payment of the debt
discharges the mortgage. The thing secured is intangible and has no situs distinct from and
apart from the residence of the holder . . . if the mere fact that a mortgage exists in a
particular county gives the property in the mortgage a situs subjecting it to taxation in that
county, a party without further legislation might be called upon to pay the tax several
times. . . " See Note (1936) 5 Wisc. L. REv. 441; accord: see Matter of Fearing, 200
N. Y. 34o, 9o N. E. 956 (1911); De Noaille's Estate, 236 Pa. 213, 84 Ati. 665 (1912) ; Gilbertson v. Oliver, 129 Ind. 568, io8 N. W. ioo2 (i9o6).
' Supra note 3.
'See Baldwin v. Missouri, supra note 5,at 595, 50 Sup. Ct. at 439; Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 3, at 215, 5o Sup. Ct. at lO1-1o2.
33 This is pointed out by Lowndes, supra note 4, at 784.
" The United States Chamber of Commerce declared by resolution May, 1928: "Inheritance taxation from an interstate standpoint is in a confused and chaotic condition. In addition to excessive delays and annoyances there is multiple taxation which at times approaches
confiscation." (1928) PRoc. NAT. TAx Ass'N 484.
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has also been denounced as raising economic barriers between states,3 5 as inconvenient,36 and as of little advantage to the state assessing such taxes.37
It should be noted parenthetically that the double taxation here under consideration is not the type of taxation under which the same thing is taxed in the
hands of two persons by the same taxing power but that type where the same
thing in the hands of the same person is taxed by two taxing powers. It is doubtful if the question of the constitutionality of having the same thing taxed by two
states would ever be reached if the statute where the land is located did not provide for the reduction of the mortgagor's interest when taxing the mortgagee's
interest, as otherwise it would probably be labeled unconstitutional as double taxation of the first type. As Professor Beale says,
"The land having been taxed once at its full value, there is nothing left
to tax except the debt it secures; and if the debt is due to a non-resident it
is not within the jurisdiction . . . The sum of the taxes assessed against
the interests of the two cannot exceed the amount of the tax on the land
itself." 31

There have been intimations to the contrary, 9 however, and the question has
never been definitely adjudicated by the Supreme Court. It presents a hurdle
which must be passed before the problem of double taxation by two states is
reached.
The broad language of the previous cases in which the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to bar double taxation would apply equally well to the taxation of the mortgagee's interest. The desirability of such phraseology has been
questioned. Mr. Justice Stone, in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
warns against the use of such a vehicle for reaching the result in that case, though
he concurred in the majority opinion. He insists that it was unnecessary to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment in that case, that other cases would soon follow
in which it would be difficult to apply the doctrine, 40 and that double taxation
in some situations might be desirable due to the nature of the legal relationsarising from certain economic interests. He expressly refers to the Multnomah
County case as one to which the application of the doctrine might be difficult.
Until recently, when the Fourteenth Amendment was invoked, double taxation was considered as well within the precepts of the Constitution. 41 The
'Governor Byrd in an address before the Virginia legislature referred to the tax on
shares of Virginia corporations owned by nonresidents as "a direct barrier to the investment
of foreign capital in Virginia." (1928) PROC. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 483.
' To determine the amount of the tax many states require the filing of ancillary wills
and retention of counsel. Such methods are expensive and in small estates almost prohibitive.
McNaughton, Multiple Successim or Inheritance Taxes in United States (1927) 164 L. T.
89. See also Simonds, Progress in Reciprocity in State Inheritanwe Taxation (1925) PRoc.
NAT'L TAX AsS'N

246; Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 99.

average income of 14 states from nonresident estates has been approximated at
about 13.Ic of the total inheritance tax revenue. (1925) PRoc. NAT'L TAX AssN 254.
' Beale, supra note 29, at 596.
'The

'Allen

v. National State Bank, 92 Md. 509, 515, 48 Atl. 78, So (19Ol):

"The fact

that our statute makes no provision for deducting the mortgage debt from any assessment
upon the mortgagor, is rather an objection to its justice and fairness than to its validity."
' The first intimation of this doctrine is contained in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra note 3, where the state of Virginia attempted to levy a property tax upon a trust
estate held by trustees in Maryland for beneficiaries domiciled in Virginia.
"280 U. S. 204, 215, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 101: "Hitherto the fact that taxation is double has
not been deemed to affect its constitutionality and there are, I think, too many situations in
which a single economic interest may have such legal relationships with different taxing
jurisdictions as to justify its tax in both, to admit of our laying down any constitutional principle broadly prohibiting taxation merely because it is double, at least until that characterization is more precisely defined. ...

NOTES

Fourteenth Amendment has been characterized as setting a "standard of fairness," 42 but its invocation to prevent double taxation has met with much criticism. Chief among the objections is that reciprocal legislation, which has been
is more to be desired
already undertaken by many states,
43 though a slower process,
than a judicial-legislative method.
"By eliminating multiple taxation the Supreme Court with a recrudescent individualism is seeking to assist the taxpayer. But as a matter of fact
it is simply forcing states on the verge of insolvency to seek new channels
44
of revenue which may bear even more grievously on those less able to pay."
45
It results in a bounty to creditor states to the prejudice of the debtor states, and
as Mr. Justice Holmes expresses it,
"there is hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of these state rights
if they happen to strike a majority of this court as for any reason desirable.
I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche
to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." 46

Moreover, at the time the Supreme Court was deciding that double taxation was'
states4 7had embarked on
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment all but twelve
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states
other
with
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rather than by constitutional interpretation.
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in the land within its borders 50 despite the fact that the owner is a non-resident, 5
and it is in connection with the more nebulous types of interests that the query
arises as to how far the ban on double taxation will be extended. A corporation
which assigns a lease for the purpose of sinking oil wells is taxable on the rentals
received from the lease. 52 A franchise pertaining to the land, such as a right to
construct a bridge, may be taxed as an interest in the shore line from which the
bridge projects. 53 A ferry franchise has been taxed by the state at whose bank
the ferry ties up.54 Whether the Court will extend its policy of using the Fourteenth Amendment as a clause inimical to double taxation in these situations is
as problematical as that it will declare double taxation of the interest of a mortgagee by both the state of the domicil and the state where the land is located
unconstitutional. It may be that the Court will be unwilling to overrule the wellestablished law that the transfer of the interest of the mortgagee is taxable by
the state where the land is located even if it decides that a mortgage is personalty.
Or it may be that it will be unwilling to overrule the holdings that the transfer of
the mortgage interest is subject to taxation by the domicil of the mortgagee even if
it decides that a mortgage is realty. The Court may feel that both states have
such an interest in the legal relation that in the present state of our economic
system both should have the right to tax the interest of the mortgagee.
M. K. G.
°Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall (U. S.) 21o (1866) ; Central R. R. v. Jersey City, 70
N. J.1L. 81, 56 Atl. 239 (1903).
Supra note 27.
'Mt. Sterling 0. & G. Co. v. Ratcliff, 127 Ky. I, 104 S. W. 993 (19o7).
Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 23 Sup. Ct. 463 (903).
Conway v. Taylor, i Black 6o3 (U. S. i861). See Beale, supra note 29. It has been
held that a lease on land in another state is not subject to inheritance taxation by the state
of domicil. DeWitt's Estate, 266 Pa. 548, log At. 699 (192o).

